Ownership
Decision rights are unclear
Leadership, IT, security, communications, and external partners disagree about who can isolate systems, notify stakeholders, or authorize recovery.
DSE Cybersecurity · Conventional incident readiness
Make the hard calls before the clock starts.
A bounded readiness engagement for executives, IT, and security teams that lack a tested first-hour plan, clear decision rights, tabletop evidence, or proof that priority systems can be restored. We turn plans, owners, dependencies, backups, and scenarios into rehearsed decisions and an actionable roadmap.
Buyer triggers
Readiness cannot be inferred from a document.
Recovery
Backups exist; proof does not
Dashboards show successful jobs, but no recent representative restore test demonstrates recovery time, recovery point, dependencies, and evidence.
Pressure
A deadline is approaching
An insurer, customer, board, audit, acquisition, or recent near miss requires evidence that the organization has exercised its response.
Method and deliverables
Plan, exercise, recover, then improve.
01
Evidence and dependency review
We review the current response plan, contact trees, system and data priorities, vendor dependencies, backup architecture, recovery records, insurance requirements, and available prior-exercise evidence.
02
Incident response plan and role mapping
We map accountable, consulted, and informed roles; escalation paths; decision authorities; communication channels; and external partner activation criteria.
03
Executive and technical tabletop
A facilitated ransomware or disruptive-cyber scenario tests business decisions and technical actions through injects tailored to the agreed environment.
04
Recovery validation
We examine stated RTO and RPO targets and scope a representative restore exercise with the client. The client or its authorized recovery provider executes the exercise; DSE observes, records restore-test evidence, timing, dependencies, exceptions, and owner decisions.
05
First-hour decision guide
A first 60 minutes decision guide records triggers, owners, containment choices, evidence preservation, business continuity, communications, and partner handoff checkpoints.
06
After-action roadmap
The after-action roadmap ranks observed gaps, assigns owners, distinguishes immediate corrections from longer work, and captures retest and partner handoff needs.
Typical timebox: 2 to 4 weeks, depending on scenario design, participant availability, and recovery-test access. Scope and fixed price are scoped after the diagnostic and confirmed in writing before work begins.
Synthetic sample · not client data
A first-hour record that supports action.
Illustrative only. Actual decisions depend on the environment, counsel, contractual duties, evidence, and authorized responders.
The sample table scrolls horizontally on smaller screens. Keyboard users can focus the labeled table region and use horizontal navigation.
| Minute / trigger | Decision owner | Decision and evidence | Next checkpoint |
|---|---|---|---|
| 00:12 · file encryption confirmed on two endpoints | Incident commander | Authorize isolation of affected segment; preserve available endpoint and identity logs; record affected assets. | Validate spread indicators and business impact at minute 25. |
| 00:32 · priority application unavailable | Business continuity lead + system owner | Invoke approved continuity procedure; compare last known-good recovery point with the stated RPO. | Decide whether to begin representative restore at minute 45. |
| 00:50 · investigation requires specialist capability | Executive sponsor | Activate the preselected response partner using the documented handoff package and route privilege and legal-notification decisions to counsel. | Confirm partner acceptance, scope, and communications owner. |
Authoritative references
A practical method grounded in public guidance.
We use NIST CSF 2.0 Respond and Recover outcomes and CISA ransomware guidance as organizing references, adapted to the client's operating context. This does not make the engagement a NIST or CISA audit and does not imply endorsement.
Boundaries and handoffs
Readiness facilitation, not emergency response.
This service is not live DFIR, not breach counsel, not a 24x7 response retainer, and not malware eradication. DSE does not provide forensic conclusions, legal advice, ransom negotiation, threat monitoring, or guaranteed recovery. Live response, forensics, legal and notification decisions, and specialist remediation remain with qualified client-selected providers. We help define activation criteria and assemble a partner handoff package; a partner relationship or availability is never implied.
Any representative restore exercise must be explicitly authorized and is executed by the client or its authorized recovery provider. DSE scopes the exercise, observes it, and records evidence. DSE makes no production changes unless implementation is separately contracted and expressly authorized.
This page covers conventional ransomware and disruptive cyber incidents. For model failure, LLM data leakage, deepfake fraud, poisoned models, and other AI-specific scenarios, use the AI-specific incident tabletop.